# Tractatus de Romano Pontifice cum prolegomeno de Ecclesia (*Treatise on the Roman Pontiff with a Prolegomenon on the Church*)

**by Domenico Palmieri (Domenico Palmieri), 1891**

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## Section XL

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| *Latin* |  | *English* |
| *Hactenus asserta infallibilitas Magisterii et Ecclesiae ad alia se porrigit, quam meras veritates revelatas.* |  | *The infallibility of the Magisterium and the Church asserted thus far extends to matters beyond merely revealed truths.* |
| **I.** Scilicet non paucae sunt veritates, quae revelatae quidem non sunt, connexionem tamen specialem habent cum veritatibus revelatis. Connexio in eo est, quod earum veritatum licet non revelatarum certitudine deficiente, sive admisso seu permisso errore iisdem adverso, vel subiectiva fides fidelium circa aliqua dogmata consistere non possit, deficiente veluti aliqua conditione, vel fidei obiectivae integritas penes fideles animarumque salus plus minus periclitetur; unde oportet certo sciri quid his in rebus tenendum sit. Spectant ad priores ea quae dicuntur facta dogmatica. Ad aliam classem spectant *a)* alia rursus in facto posita, nimirum *textus* qui dicuntur *dogmatici*; textus nempe humanae quidem originis, at quoad doctrinam, quam continent, conformes vel difformes doctrinae revelatae. Veritas in his necessaria scitu haec est, utrum hi textus sint necne conformes veritati, utrum necne haeresim aut errorem contineant. Spectant *b)* ad hanc classem plures veritates sive speculativae sive practicae adversae iis propositionibus falsis ex quibus periculum fidei vel animarum salutis consequi potest. |  | **I.** Indeed, there are not a few truths which, though not revealed, nevertheless have a special connection with revealed truths. This connection consists in the fact that, should the certainty of these non-revealed truths be deficient, or should error contrary to them be admitted or permitted, either the subjective faith of the faithful concerning certain dogmas could not stand firm (as though some condition were lacking), or the objective integrity of the faith among the faithful and the salvation of souls would be endangered to a greater or lesser degree. Hence, it is necessary to know with certainty what must be held in these matters. To the former category belong what are called dogmatic facts. To another class belong *a)* other matters based on fact, namely *dogmatic texts*; that is, texts of human origin, but which, regarding the doctrine they contain, are either conformable or non-conformable to revealed doctrine. The truth necessary to be known in these cases is whether or not these texts conform to truth, whether or not they contain heresy or error. *b)* To this class also belong several truths, whether speculative or practical, which are contrary to those false propositions from which danger to faith or to the salvation of souls might result. |
| Quod ut clarius intelligatur, distinguendum est inter id cuius *certitudo* nobis necessaria est ut aliquid aliud sit *certum*, et id cuius veritas necessaria est, ut aliquid aliud sit *verum*. Id enim cuius certitudo (utique subiectiva) nobis necessaria est, potest esse aliquid prorsus extrinsecum rei verae, quae a veritate illius sit independens: ita certitudo immaculati conceptus B. V. requirit certitudinem de auctoritate illius qui eum definivit; haec tamen veritas extrinseca est veritati immaculati conceptus, nec necessaria ut hic sit verus. Id autem cuius veritas necessaria est ut aliud sit verum, quod idcirco huiusmodi est ut si ipsum sit falsum, et aliud quoque falsum sit oporteat, est ita intrinsece nexum cum veritate huius alterius, ut sit elementum quoddam adaequatae veritatis eius contineaturque comprehensione eius veritatis. Ita elementum veritatis de animi immortalitate est eiusdem spiritualitas. Quare intellectus qui rem comprehendit, cum unam veritatem affirmat, intendit quoque affirmare implicite quidquid cum ea veritate est necessario nexum *connexione veritatis*: secus enim contradictio quaedam in affirmatione haberetur. Contingit quidem frequenter, ut cum aliquid affimant homines, non intendant, imo positive nolint affirmare id quod tamen cum eo quod affirmant est intrinsece nexum; sed id ex eo oritur quod homines non comprehendant res atque errori sint obnoxii: intendunt nihilominus affirmare quidquid censent esse cum re affirmata connexum intrinsece. Cum ergo Deus omnia comprehendat, si quid affirmat, eo ipso implicite affirmat quidquid cum eo intrinsece nexum est connexione veritatis. Attamen non exinde sequitur, has omnes veritates esse revelatas. Etenim veritas revelata ea dicitur, quae sit terminus talis divinae locutionis, ut ad eam tenendam non opus sit, tanquam motivo, nisi auctoritate Dei loquentis. In ea comprehenduntur etiam omnia quae sola analysi in revelata reperiuntur, nam ea sunt veluti partes aut elementa veritatis revelatae, eademque nobis a Deo loquente manifestantur. Eae autem veritates, quae ope alterius veritatis ex revelata, deductione plus minus proxima, colliguntur, licet implicite affirmentur a Deo, supposito veritatum necessario nexu, non tamen a Deo sunt revelatae; quia non manifestantur nobis a Deo loquente: nam ut eas teneamus non sufficit auctoritas Dei, sed requiritur etiam principium aliquod rationis, quae in ratiocinio instituendo falli tandem potest. Sunt ergo revelatae quaedam veritates, quaedam sunt nexae cum revelatis, non revelatae. Iam vero si veritates illae deductae negentur, periclitari potest fides; nam admisso opposito errore, potest ope ratiocinii ex eo deveniri ad negandum id quod est de fide. Et si veritates eae spectent ad mores, potest, iis negatis, periclitari pietas et salus animarum propter eandem rationem. Sicut ergo errores iis veritatibus adversi detrimentum afferre possunt fidei et saluti animarum, ita propugnatio earum veritatum utilis et necessaria esse potest, ut fides integra servetur animarumque salus sit in tuto. |  | For a clearer understanding, we must distinguish between that whose *certainty* is necessary for us in order that something else be *certain*, and that whose truth is necessary in order that something else be *true*. For that whose certainty (subjective, of course) is necessary for us can be something entirely extrinsic to the true matter, which is independent of the truth of the former: thus the certainty of the immaculate conception of the Blessed Virgin requires certainty about the authority of the one who defined it; yet this truth is extrinsic to the truth of the immaculate conception, and not necessary for the latter to be true. However, that whose truth is necessary for something else to be true, which is therefore such that if it itself were false, the other would necessarily be false as well, is so intrinsically connected with the truth of this other that it is a certain element of its adequate truth and is contained in the comprehension of that truth. Thus, an element of the truth of the soul’s immortality is its spirituality. Therefore, an intellect that comprehends a thing, when it affirms one truth, intends also to affirm implicitly whatever is necessarily connected with that truth by a *connection of truth*: otherwise, there would be a certain contradiction in the affirmation. Indeed, it frequently happens that when people affirm something, they do not intend, or even positively do not wish to affirm that which nevertheless is intrinsically connected with what they affirm; but this arises from the fact that humans do not comprehend things and are subject to error: nevertheless, they intend to affirm whatever they believe to be intrinsically connected with the thing affirmed. Since, therefore, God comprehends all things, if He affirms something, by that very fact He implicitly affirms whatever is intrinsically connected with it by a connection of truth. However, it does not follow from this that all these truths are revealed. For a revealed truth is called that which is the terminus of such divine speech, that for holding it, no other motive is needed except the authority of God speaking. In it are also comprehended all things which are found in the revealed truth by analysis alone, for these are like parts or elements of the revealed truth, and they are manifested to us by God speaking. However, those truths which are gathered from revealed truth with the aid of another truth, by deduction more or less proximate, although implicitly affirmed by God, given the necessary connection of truths, are nevertheless not revealed by God; because they are not manifested to us by God speaking: for in order that we hold them, the authority of God is not sufficient, but some principle of reason is also required, which can ultimately err in forming a rationale. Therefore, some truths are revealed, while others are connected with revealed truths but not revealed. Now if those deduced truths are denied, faith can be endangered; for if the opposite error is admitted, one can arrive through reasoning from it to denying what is of faith. And if these truths pertain to morals, piety and the salvation of souls can be endangered if they are denied, for the same reason. Therefore, just as errors opposed to these truths can bring harm to faith and the salvation of souls, so the defense of these truths can be useful and necessary in order that faith be preserved intact and the salvation of souls be secure. |
| Quemadmodum veritates nexae cum revelatis sunt eae quae ex his colliguntur ope alterius veritatis non revelatae: ita esse possunt et aliae quae a Deo revelante supponantur, licet non revelentur; quibus negatis nec certitudo circa veritates revelatas possit consistere. Cum enim ordo revelationis supponat ordinem rationalem nec omnes veritates huius ordinis Deus revelaverit, nihil impedit quominus aliquas Deus supposuerit, implicite quidem affirmans, sed non manifestans. Huiusmodi autem veritates ad priorem classem spectarent. |  | Just as truths connected with revealed truths are those which are gathered from them with the aid of another truth that is not revealed, so too there can be other truths which are presupposed by God who reveals, although they are not themselves revealed; should these be denied, certainty concerning revealed truths could not stand. For since the order of revelation presupposes the rational order, and God has not revealed all truths of this order, nothing prevents God from having presupposed some truths, affirming them implicitly indeed, but not manifesting them. Truths of this kind, moreover, would belong to the former class. |
| Ceterum advertendum est quod ut defendamus id quod proponimus in Thesi, opus non est ut definiamus determinate quaenam sint hae veritates nexae cum revelatis; sed probata possibilitate earum, quod iam praestitimus, satis est nobis hypothetice loqui: si nempe sunt huiusmodi veritates et errores proinde iis oppositi; circa haec exerceri potest auctoritas infallibilis Ecclesiae. Refellendi sunt enim adversarii Ecclesiae, qui contra eius auctoritatem excipiunt dicentes, plura, quae ab ea definiuntur, non esse revelata sed rationalia vel philosophica; ideoque extra ambitum auctoritatis Ecclesiae: satis est autem ad hos refellendos statuere, quod etsi hae veritates non sint revelatae, tamen auctoritas infallibilis magisterii Ecclesiae ad eas se porrigit. Hic est enim Ecclesiae sensus, quod nempe ipsa ius habeat auctoritate sui magisterii uti tum circa veritates revelatas tum etiam circa alias. Qui quidem sensus ex his liquet. Primo enim Ecclesia proscribendo propositiones falsas, non eas tantum proscripsit, quae censura haeresis dignae sunt; sed quae erroneae, falsae, perniciosae, scandalosae, temerariae, piarum aurium offensivae etc. sunt. Deinde id evidentius declaravit Romana Sedes, scilicet Pius IX. in Brevi *Gravissimas inter* 11. Decemb. 1862. et alio *Tuas libenter* 21 Dec. 1863. Cf. Enchiridion Denzinger edit, 4ª pag. 436. et 463. |  | Furthermore, it should be noted that in order to defend what we propose in the Thesis, it is not necessary for us to determine specifically which are these truths connected with revealed ones; but having proven the possibility of their existence, which we have already demonstrated, it is sufficient for us to speak hypothetically: namely, if there are truths of this kind and consequently errors opposed to them, the infallible authority of the Church can be exercised concerning these matters. For the adversaries of the Church must be refuted, who object against her authority, saying that many things which are defined by her are not revealed but rational or philosophical; and therefore beyond the scope of the Church’s authority. However, to refute these objectors, it is sufficient to establish that even if these truths are not revealed, nevertheless the infallible authority of the Church’s magisterium extends to them. For this is the Church’s understanding, namely that she has the right to use the authority of her magisterium both concerning revealed truths and also concerning others. This understanding is clear from the following. First, the Church, in proscribing false propositions, has not only proscribed those which are worthy of the censure of heresy, but also those which are erroneous, false, pernicious, scandalous, rash, offensive to pious ears, etc. Furthermore, the Roman See has declared this more evidently, specifically Pius IX in the Brief *Gravissimas inter* of December 11, 1862, and in another *Tuas libenter* of December 21, 1863. Cf. Denzinger’s Enchiridion, 4th edition, pages 436 and 463. |
| Circa haec igitur contendimus versari infallibilitatem Ecclesiae. Quaestio excitata est a Iansenianis quoad facta dogmatica, occasione damnationis libri Iansenii, cui titulus *Augustinus*. Textus dogmatici speciali ratione nectuntur cum doctrina revelata, nam vel continent ipsam, vel continent oppositam ipsi doctrinam. Cum impossibile sit aliquem librum doctrinalem non continere aliquam doctrinam, quae vel vera vel falsa sit oportet; quemadmodum fieri nequit ut humano more loquaris, quin aliquid dicas: haec duo, doctrina quaedam quae est obiectum libri quaeque per se spectat ad ius et expressio eius per librum quae est ipsum factum, inseparabilia sunt unumque re constituunt, scilicet expressionem doctrinae per scriptum, sive doctrinam scripto expressam. Si definitur, librum aliquem continere doctrinam veram vel falsam, obiectum directum definitionis, in quod nempe tendit directe intentio definientis, est ipsum factum, obliquum est ius, quod simul cum illo definitur: si enim dicis librum hunc continere haeresim, dicis quoque doctrinam, quae eo continetur, esse haeresim. Definitio huius facti huc redit, ut definiatur sensus libri. Sensus autem duplex distingui debet: sensus in mente auctoris exsistens et sensus quem verba simul constructa et ordinata ex se ipsis exhibent nataque sunt gignere in mente eorum qui illa verba intelligunt. Ille prior dici potest sensus subiectivus, hic obiectivus. Ratio cur distinguere oporteat, est quia fieri potest ut aliud quis dicat quam quod mente versat et vult significare, atque de actibus mere internis Ecclesia nequit iudicare. Sensus autem obiectivus merito dicitur intentus ab Auctore; quia iure praesumitur, ipsum voluisse dicere quod dicit. Praeterea significatur ea formula, quod sensus, qui libro tribuitur, non est confictus et ab extrinseco veluti illatus, sed vere exsurgit ex toto contextu scriptionis ab Auctore profectae. Porro definitio Ecclesiae non nisi super hunc sensum cadit. Neque cum liber definitur haereticus, definitur eo ipso quod auctor fuerit formaliter haereticus: potuit enim imprudenter errare. |  | Concerning these matters, therefore, we contend that the infallibility of the Church operates. This question was raised by the Jansenists regarding dogmatic facts, on the occasion of the condemnation of Jansenius’s book titled *Augustinus*. Dogmatic texts are specially connected with revealed doctrine, for they either contain it or contain doctrine opposed to it. Since it is impossible for any doctrinal book not to contain some doctrine, which must be either true or false; just as it is impossible to speak in a human manner without saying something: these two elements—a certain doctrine which is the object of the book and which in itself pertains to law, and the expression of it through the book which is the fact itself—are inseparable and constitute one reality, namely the expression of doctrine through writing, or doctrine expressed in writing. If it is defined that a certain book contains true or false doctrine, the direct object of the definition, that is, what the intention of the one defining directly aims at, is the fact itself, while the law, which is defined simultaneously with it, is indirect: for if you say that this book contains heresy, you also say that the doctrine contained in it is heresy. The definition of this fact amounts to defining the sense of the book. However, a twofold sense must be distinguished: the sense existing in the mind of the author and the sense which the words constructed and arranged together present from themselves and are naturally able to generate in the minds of those who understand those words. The former can be called the subjective sense, the latter the objective sense. The reason why this distinction must be made is that one can say something other than what one has in mind and wishes to signify, and the Church cannot judge purely internal acts. The objective sense, however, is rightly said to be intended by the Author; because it is justly presumed that he wanted to say what he says. Moreover, this formula signifies that the sense attributed to the book is not fabricated and imposed, as it were, from outside, but truly emerges from the entire context of the writing produced by the Author. Furthermore, the Church’s definition falls only upon this sense. Nor when a book is defined as heretical is it thereby defined that the author was formally a heretic: for he could have erred imprudently. |
| **II.** His positis, ut demonstrationem ingrediamur, praestituere oportet, Ecclesiam non esse tantum *testem* veritatis, sed *magistram et iudicem*. Scilicet Ecclesia instituta est ut homines in salutem deducat: deducit autem primo docendo, tradendo nempe salutarem doctrinam et errores saluti infestos removendo. Finis ergo Ecclesiae postulat ut ipsa sit magistra veritatis omnis salutaris et per eam cavere possint homines errores omnes, qui salutis consecutionem impedire possent. Unde Ecclesiae magisterio promissus est Spiritus veritatis, qui ducet illud in omnem veritatem, omnem nempe necessariam saluti hominum. Prout ergo Ecclesia veritatem docet erroresque proscribit idque exsequitur auctoritate coactiva, est *magistra veritatis*. Et quia necesse fuit ut eadem auctoritate controversiae circa doctrinam finirentur, quatenus id praestat Ecclesia, dicitur esse *iudex doctrinae*. Prout vero docens vel iudicans refert eam veritatem, quam a Deo revelante accepit, dicitur esse *testis veritatis*; exsequitur enim munus testantis. Haec nequeunt ab ullo negari. Quaestio est autem an eatenus pateat munus *magistri*, quatenus patet munus *testis*: munus vero testis intelligitur munus authentice testandi factum revelationis alicuius veritatis: veritas autem revelata intelligitur ea, quam superius definivimus. Huc redit omnis nostra controversia cum adversariis, qui volunt Ecclesiam illud solum docere posse, quod Deus revelavit. Probamus ergo 1° auctoritatem magisterii Ecclesiae se porrigere ad alias veritates, ad eas nempe quarum iam notionem dedimus: 2° in his quoque docendis, sicut et in proscribendis erroribus oppositis, infallibile esse Ecclesiae magisterium. |  | **II.** Having established these points, in order to proceed with our demonstration, it is necessary to establish that the Church is not merely a *witness* to truth, but a *teacher and judge*. That is to say, the Church was instituted to lead men to salvation: it leads first by teaching, namely by transmitting saving doctrine and removing errors hostile to salvation. Therefore, the purpose of the Church demands that it be the teacher of all salvific truth, and through it men can avoid all errors that might impede the attainment of salvation. Hence, the Spirit of truth has been promised to the Church’s magisterium, which will lead it into all truth, namely all truth necessary for human salvation. Insofar as the Church teaches truth and proscribes errors, and executes this with coercive authority, it is a *teacher of truth*. And because it was necessary that controversies concerning doctrine be resolved by the same authority, the Church, insofar as it accomplishes this, is said to be a *judge of doctrine*. Insofar as it, while teaching or judging, conveys that truth which it received from God the revealer, it is said to be a *witness to truth*; for it carries out the duty of one who testifies. These things cannot be denied by anyone. The question, however, is whether the office of *teacher* extends as far as the office of *witness*: the office of witness is understood as the office of authentically testifying to the fact of revelation of some truth: but revealed truth is understood as that which we defined above. All our controversy with adversaries, who maintain that the Church can only teach what God has revealed, comes down to this. We therefore prove: 1) that the authority of the Church’s magisterium extends to other truths, namely to those of which we have already given the notion; 2) that in teaching these truths, as well as in proscribing opposing errors, the Church’s magisterium is infallible. |
| Sane quoad 1m Magisterium Ecclesiae eo spectat ut per veram doctrinam dirigat fideles in salutem: oportet ergo ut illud omne docere possit, quod scitu necessarium vel utile est ad salutem omnesque eos possit removere errores, qui impedimento esse possent consecutioni salutis. Item Ecclesiae commissum est depositum revelationis integre et inviolate custodiendum: munus proinde Ecclesiae incumbit sollicite curandi, ut Christianorum fides pura sit et intemerata, ut veritas immunis ab omni commixtione erroris conservetur et deceptionis periculum removeatur. Officium proinde incumbit Ecclesiae curandi, ne credendum aut tenendum proponatur, quod veram notitiam fidei labefactare posset. Atqui plures sunt veritates praeter revelatas, quas necesse est vel utile scire: plures sunt errores, etsi non directe oppositi veritatibus revelatis, quos tanquam tales cognoscere rursus necesse est vel utile, ut fides integra et illibata in fidelium mentibus conservetur, ut periculum verae amittendae fidei caveatur atque ita viam salutis tuto arripere valeant fideles; ergo. Maior est evidens: minor patet ex iam dictis: fac enim dubios fideles exsistere circa ea facta, quae diximus dogmatica, aut illa negare, concilium puta vaticanum non fuisse legitimum; neque fides eorum circa definita ab eo perseverare poterit: fac eos putare librum aliquem haereticum continere doctrinam catholicam, cum plurimi praesertim idonei non sint ad diiudicandum inter verum et falsum, decepti facillime amplectentur doctrinam haereticam: fac eos tenere doctrinas oppositas deductionibus ex veritatibus revelatis, eo tandem adduci poterunt ut ipsas veritates revelatas negent. Ita vero et puritas fidei violatur et impeditur via salutis, a qua error praesertim in re morali abducat necesse est. Porro his occurri non potest nisi magisterio: ius autem et officium docendi habet Ecclesia, quae instituta est magistra omnium in iis quae ad salutem spectant, cuique soli concreditum est depositum revelationis. Ergo. |  | Indeed, concerning the first point, the Magisterium of the Church aims to direct the faithful toward salvation through true doctrine. Therefore, it must be able to teach everything that is necessary or useful to know for salvation, and it must be able to remove all errors that could impede the attainment of salvation. Likewise, the Church has been entrusted with preserving the deposit of revelation completely and inviolately. Thus, the duty falls upon the Church to carefully ensure that the faith of Christians remains pure and unblemished, that truth is preserved free from any mixture of error, and that the danger of deception is removed. Consequently, the Church has the duty to ensure that nothing is proposed as requiring belief or acceptance that could undermine the true knowledge of faith. Now, there are many truths beyond revealed ones that are necessary or useful to know; there are many errors, even if not directly opposed to revealed truths, which it is again necessary or useful to recognize as such, so that faith may be preserved whole and unblemished in the minds of the faithful, so that the danger of losing true faith may be avoided, and thus the faithful may be able to securely take the path of salvation. The major premise is evident; the minor premise is clear from what has already been said. For suppose the faithful were to be doubtful about those facts which we have called dogmatic, or were to deny them—for instance, that the Vatican Council was not legitimate—their faith concerning what it defined could not persevere. Suppose they were to think that some heretical book contained Catholic doctrine, since many people, especially, are not capable of discerning between truth and falsehood, they would very easily be deceived and embrace heretical doctrine. Suppose they were to hold doctrines opposed to deductions from revealed truths; they could finally be led to deny the revealed truths themselves. Thus indeed the purity of faith is violated and the way of salvation is impeded, from which error, especially in moral matters, necessarily leads away. Furthermore, these issues cannot be addressed except through the magisterium. The Church, which has been established as the teacher of all in matters pertaining to salvation, and to which alone the deposit of revelation has been entrusted, has the right and duty to teach. Therefore. |
| Idem confirmatur praxi et doctrina Ecclesiae quae, praeter haereses, proscripsit quoque errores adversos veritatibus, quas fides supponit, vel quae ex fide et ratione deducuntur: cf. articulos Nicolai de Ultricuria damnatos a S. Sede an. 1348. (Denzinger p. 183.), articulos Wiclephi et Hus damnatos in Concilio Constantiensi et tot propositiones a sequentibus Pontificibus damnatas. Speciatim quoad textus dogmaticos, Concilium V. coactum est pro proscribendis tribus capitulis: quoad facta dogmatica, Martinus V. in Bulla *Inter cunctas*, praecipit interrogari suspectos « utrum credant quod Papa canonice electus, qui pro tempore fuerit, eius nomine proprio expresso, sit successor b. Petri, habens supremam auctoritatem in Ecclesia Dei ». Non solum ergo definitur, credendum generalim hoc verum, nempe quod canonice electus in Romanam Sedem sit successor Petri; sed quod haec persona (id enim sibi volunt ea verba: *eius nomine proprio expresso*), puta hic homo, qui dicitur Leo XIII., est successor Petri, habens auctoritatem in Ecclesia: hoc porro est factum dogmaticum. Ecclesia ergo censet auctoritatem sibi competere proponendi huiusmodi vera et exigendi in ea fidem a subditis. |  | The same is confirmed by the practice and doctrine of the Church which, besides heresies, has also proscribed errors contrary to truths which faith presupposes, or which are deduced from faith and reason: cf. the articles of Nicholas of Autrecourt condemned by the Holy See in 1348 (Denzinger p. 183), the articles of Wycliffe and Hus condemned at the Council of Constance, and so many propositions condemned by subsequent Pontiffs. Specifically regarding dogmatic texts, the Fifth Council was convened to proscribe the Three Chapters; regarding dogmatic facts, Martin V in the Bull *Inter cunctas*, commands that those suspected be asked “whether they believe that the canonically elected Pope, whoever he may be at the time, his proper name being expressly stated, is the successor of blessed Peter, having supreme authority in the Church of God.” Therefore, it is not only defined that this truth is to be believed generally, namely that one canonically elected to the Roman See is the successor of Peter; but that this person (for this is what the words *his proper name being expressly stated* mean), say this man who is called Leo XIII, is the successor of Peter, having authority in the Church: this indeed is a dogmatic fact. The Church, therefore, considers that it has the authority to propose such truths and to demand faith in them from its subjects. |
| **III.** Dicimus 2° magisterium Ecclesiae quoad has quoque veritates esse infallibile. Etenim id requiritur illa eadem ratione, qua requiritur in his auctoritas Ecclesiae, quae facere non posset satis suo fini, si fallibilis esset. Hoc enim posito nec ipsa obligare valeret fideles ad credendum quod proponit, nec certo constaret verum esse quod ipsa docet; ideoque finis huius magisterii non obtineretur. Et sane Ecclesia infallibilis esse debet in custodiendo deposito fidei; est enim columna et firmamentum veritatis: oportet ergo ut infallibilis sit in iis actibus, quibus depositum fidei custoditur; atqui huiusmodi actus non sunt solum definitiones dogmatis revelati haeresisque condemnationes, sed et ii sunt quibus errores proscribuntur, ex quibus damnum fidei oriri potest oppositaeque veritates statuuntur, quibus textuum dogmaticorum sensus determinatur: ergo in his quoque definiendis infallibilis est Ecclesia. Item infallibilitas est dos necessaria magisterii Ecclesiae; eo ergo se porriget quo ex officio sibi imposito se porrigit auctoritas docendi: atqui haec se extendit quoque ad alias veritates; ergo. |  | **III.** We say secondly that the magisterium of the Church is infallible with respect to these truths as well. Indeed, this is required for the same reason that the authority of the Church is required in these matters, which could not adequately fulfill its purpose if it were fallible. For if this were the case, the Church could neither oblige the faithful to believe what it proposes, nor would it be certain that what it teaches is true; thus, the purpose of this magisterium would not be achieved. And indeed, the Church must be infallible in guarding the deposit of faith; for it is the pillar and foundation of truth: therefore it must be infallible in those acts by which the deposit of faith is safeguarded. But such acts are not only definitions of revealed dogma and condemnations of heresy, but also those by which errors are proscribed—from which damage to the faith can arise—and opposing truths are established, and by which the meaning of dogmatic texts is determined: therefore, in defining these matters as well, the Church is infallible. Likewise, infallibility is a necessary endowment of the Church’s magisterium; therefore it will extend as far as the authority to teach extends by virtue of the office imposed upon it: but this authority extends also to other truths; therefore [the infallibility extends to them as well]. |
| Et re quidem vera id semper creditum est in Ecclesia, in qua semper absolute affirmatum et retentum est Ecclesiae magisterium esse infallibile; in qua, licet ea definita sint, quae non erant revelata ut e. g. tria capitula esse haeretica, nihilominus semper postulata est fides ea quae debetur magisterio infallibili. Ecclesia praeterea huiusmodi suis definitionibus assensum mentis interiorem praecipit eumque necessarium esse decrevit et declaravit Clemens XI. (Constit. *Vineam Domini*) et ex conscientia deberi docuit Pius IX. locis superius citatis. Atqui auctoritas fallibilis nequit praecipere assensum mentis suis definitionibus, qui ex conscientia debeatur, sub poena proinde aeternae damnationis: censet ergo Ecclesia se in his quoque infallibilem esse[^1]. |  | And indeed it has always been believed in the Church, in which it has always been absolutely affirmed and maintained that the magisterium of the Church is infallible; in which, although things have been defined that were not revealed, such as, for example, that the Three Chapters are heretical, nevertheless faith has always been demanded of the kind that is owed to the infallible magisterium. Moreover, the Church, by such definitions, commands an interior assent of the mind, which Clement XI (Constitution *Vineam Domini*) has decreed and declared to be necessary, and which Pius IX, in the places cited above, has taught to be owed in conscience. However, a fallible authority cannot command an assent of the mind to its definitions, which would be owed in conscience, consequently under penalty of eternal damnation: therefore the Church considers itself to be infallible in these matters as well. |
| Speciatim autem quoad textus dogmaticos possunt Ianseniani refelli argumento ad hominem. Nam et ipsi concedunt Ecclesiam in damnandis propositionibus haereticis e. g. quinque Iansenii, infallibilem esse. Atqui qui id concedit, concedit Ecclesiam falli non posse in determinando sensu propositionis damnatae; nisi enim id verum sit, Ecclesia poterit tanquam haereticam traducere propositionem catholicam et ita haeresim docere cum propositionem proscribit. Atqui propositio aliqua et libri contextus integer non differunt specie, sed tantum materialiter secundum plus et minus: ergo si infallibiliter determinat Ecclesia sensum propositionis, potest et totius libri determinare infallibiliter sensum. Et sane si potest unius propositionis, poterit et alterius et ita porro: ex propositionibus autem exsurgit liber. Aut dicant nobis Ianseniani quanta debeat esse propositionis magnitudo, ultra quam desinit infallibilitas Ecclesiae. |  | Specifically, however, regarding dogmatic texts, the Jansenists can be refuted by an argument ad hominem. For they themselves concede that the Church is infallible in condemning heretical propositions, e.g., the five propositions of Jansenius. But whoever concedes this, concedes that the Church cannot err in determining the meaning of a condemned proposition; unless this were true, the Church could denounce as heretical a catholic proposition and thus teach heresy when it proscribes a proposition. But a single proposition and the entire context of a book do not differ in kind, but only materially according to greater or lesser extent: therefore, if the Church infallibly determines the meaning of a proposition, it can also infallibly determine the meaning of an entire book. And indeed, if it can do so for one proposition, it can do so for another and so on: and from propositions a book is formed. Or let the Jansenists tell us how great must be the size of a proposition, beyond which the infallibility of the Church ceases[^1]. |
| **IV.** Diximus Ecclesiam definire infallibiliter posse veritates eas, quarum notitia certa sit necessaria vel *utilis*. Ratio cur hoc addiderimus est quia si notitia certa eius veritatis utilis est pro conservanda integritate dogmatis aut salute animarum collocanda in tuto, vel si pariter ad eundem finem utile est nosse propositionem aliquam falsam esse et reiiciendam, iam adest connexio eius veritatis cum dogmate, quatenus conducit ad integritatem eius servandam et pariter connexio erroris cum dogmate, quatenus conduceret ad illud labefactandum. Porro Ecclesia ius habens ad finem, ius habet quoque ad media h. e. ad id quod est utile ad finem, ideoque et ad definiendam veritatem cuius notitia utilis est ad finem quem intendere debet. |  | **IV.** We have said that the Church can infallibly define those truths whose certain knowledge is necessary or *useful*. The reason why we have added this is because if certain knowledge of a truth is useful for preserving the integrity of dogma or for securing the salvation of souls, or if likewise it is useful for the same end to know that some proposition is false and should be rejected, there already exists a connection between that truth and dogma, insofar as it contributes to preserving its integrity, and likewise a connection between error and dogma, insofar as it would lead to undermining it. Moreover, the Church, having the right to the end, also has the right to the means, that is, to that which is useful for the end, and therefore also to defining a truth whose knowledge is useful for the end which it ought to pursue. |
| Ex demonstratis liquet auctoritatem Ecclesiae eiusque infallibilitatem in huiusmodi definitionibus esse veritatem revelatam, quamvis obiectum definitum non sit revelatum. Cuiusmodi sit hic actus fidei dicemus mox in sequentibus. |  | From what has been demonstrated, it is clear that the authority of the Church and its infallibility in such definitions is a revealed truth, although the defined object may not be revealed. We shall explain shortly in what follows what kind of act of faith this is. |
| **COROLLARIUM.** Ergo merito Ecclesia ius sibi vindicat censuris aliis praeter censuram haeresis notandi propositiones, quibus fides et morum honestas quomodocumque impetatur. |  | **COROLLARY.** Therefore, the Church rightly claims for itself the right to mark with censures other than the censure of heresy those propositions by which the faith and moral integrity are in any way attacked. |
| [^1]: Cf. Dissertat. 4a Garnerii in Marium Merc. p. 7, *de Subscriptionibus etc.*: ubi bene demonstrat, huc spectasse Ecclesiam, cum non solum errores, sed et personas damnabat exigebatque subscriptionem utrique damnationi, ut in causa haeresis Pelagianae. |  |  |
| **V.** Quaeritur, cuiusmodi sit hic actus fidei, qui praestatur Magisterio haec, quae revelata non sunt, docenti. Non est actus fidei divinae, quae auctoritati Dei revelantis inititur; cum revelatio desit: sed est actus fidei religiosae, quae inititur auctoritati Magisterii infallibilis divinitus instituti. Haec fides debetur; quia Magisterium divinitus institutum et infallibile habet ius exigendi assensum ad ea quae docet. |  | **V.** The question is asked, what kind of act of faith is that which is given to the Magisterium teaching these things which are not revealed. It is not an act of divine faith, which relies on the authority of God revealing; since revelation is lacking: but it is an act of religious faith, which relies on the authority of the divinely instituted infallible Magisterium. This faith is owed; because the divinely instituted and infallible Magisterium has the right to demand assent to those things which it teaches. |
|  |  | Furthermore, observe that this religious faith given to the teaching Magisterium also has its place when the Church proposes revealed truths to be believed: for we believe the teaching Church that God has revealed those things; although we also embrace this same truth by divine faith, as Theologians teach in the Treatise on Faith. |
| Porro adverte, quod haec fides religiosa praestita Magisterio docenti tunc quoque habet locum, cum Ecclesia proponit credendas veritates revelatas: credimus enim Ecclesiae docenti quod ea Deus revelaverit; quamvis et hoc idem fide divina amplectamur, ut in Tract. de Fide docent Theologi. |  |  |
| **VI.** Doctrinam Ecclesia proponit per signa sensibilia, quae sunt generatim propositiones ex verbis constantes, quorum significatio iam fixa et nota est ac esse debet, ut quod Ecclesia dicit valeant assequi homines: quod tamen non impedit, quominus Ecclesia nova vocabula composita, cum vis componentium sit cognita, cudere possit atque, si multiplex sit possibilis vocabuli significatio, determinare sensum, quo ab ea accipitur et ab aliis in doctrina fidei accipiendum sit. Porro ex hac necessaria ratione docendi, ut nempe signis Ecclesia uti debeat et quidem verbis cum definit (quamvis enim et aliis signis doctrina proponi possit, quia tamen definitiones Ecclesiae clarae esse debent ita ut quaestiones dirimant, huiusmodi autem signa non sunt nisi verba, opus est ut cum controversiae in ipsa Ecclesia exsistunt, verbis sententia definitiva Ecclesiae proponatur) atque ex fine definitionis, qui est ut veritas manifestetur hominibus errorque profligetur, consequitur necessario, Ecclesiam infallibilem esse in usu formularum quibus doctrinam proponit. Quae infallibilitas in eo est posita, ut verba ab Ecclesia adhibita illud reapse repraesentent quod Ecclesia vult docere, nec fieri possit ut Ecclesia erret in electione et usu huiusmodi signorum; fieri scilicet non possit ut Ecclesia vel contrarium vel diversum extrinsecus per signa dicat ab eo, quod concipit et dicere vult. Sane si id contingere posset, inutilis prorsus esset institutio magisterii Ecclesiae eiusque infallibilitatis; nihil enim homines discernt nec de ulla re certiores fieri possent; cum posita locutione Ecclesiae, adhuc ignorarent, quid ex Ecclesiae decreto credendum sibi esset. Vel si homines crederent quidquid Ecclesia docendo manifestaret per verba, cum credere non valerent nisi quod per ea verba intelligerent, frequenter homines a magisterio Ecclesiae ducerentur in errorem. Cum ergo magisterium Ecclesiae sit sensibile et in suo exercitio sit infallibile; necesse est, ut et forma quoque sensibilis, qua veritas repraesentatur, infallibiliter sit vera. |  | **VI.** The Church proposes doctrine through sensible signs, which are generally propositions consisting of words whose meaning is already fixed and known and must be so, so that people may grasp what the Church says. This does not prevent the Church from coining new compound words, when the force of their components is known, and, if multiple possible meanings of a word exist, from determining the sense in which it is understood by her and should be understood by others in the doctrine of faith. Furthermore, from this necessary method of teaching—namely that the Church must use signs, and indeed words when defining (for although doctrine can be proposed by other signs as well, since the definitions of the Church must be clear so as to settle questions, and since signs of this kind are none other than words, it is necessary that when controversies arise within the Church itself, the definitive judgment of the Church be proposed in words)—and from the purpose of definition, which is to manifest truth to men and to overthrow error, it necessarily follows that the Church is infallible in the use of formulas by which she proposes doctrine. This infallibility consists in this: that the words employed by the Church truly represent what the Church wishes to teach, and it cannot happen that the Church errs in the selection and use of such signs; that is, it cannot happen that the Church says outwardly through signs something contrary to or different from what she conceives and wishes to say. Indeed, if this could happen, the institution of the Church’s teaching authority and its infallibility would be utterly useless; for men would learn nothing and could not be made certain of anything, since, even after the Church had spoken, they would still be ignorant of what they should believe according to the Church’s decree. Or if people were to believe whatever the Church manifested through words in her teaching, since they could only believe what they understood through those words, men would frequently be led into error by the Church’s magisterium. Therefore, since the Church’s magisterium is sensible and infallible in its exercise, it is necessary that the sensible form by which truth is represented be infallibly true as well. |
| Neque haec est alia infallibilitas, sed est ipsa infallibilitas magisterii, quod est essentialiter sociale et sensibile: magisterium enim refertur ad discipulos et cum referatur ad homines, refertur modo sensibili; unde magisterium Ecclesiae infallibile est magisterium infallibiliter docens homines sensibili modo. |  | Nor is this another infallibility, but it is the very infallibility of the magisterium, which is essentially social and perceptible: for the magisterium refers to disciples, and since it refers to human beings, it does so in a perceptible manner; hence the infallible magisterium of the Church is a magisterium that infallibly teaches humans in a perceptible way. |
|  |  | And indeed *faith in the heart leads to righteousness, but confession with the mouth leads to salvation* (Romans X. 10); namely, a profession of faith is required, which cannot be made without certain verbal formulas: and this profession must be true and must be made under the direction of the Church’s magisterium. Therefore, it is necessary that the Church be immune from error in determining these formulas. |
| *corde creditur ad iustitiam, ore autem confessio fit ad salutem* (Rom. X. 10.); professio nempe fidei postulatur, quae sine certis verborum formulis fieri nequit: ea autem vera esse debet et sub magisterii Ecclesiae directione facienda est. Oportet ergo ut Ecclesia immunis sit ab errore in determinatione earundem formularum. |  |  |
| Unde Apostolus praecipit Timotheo epist. 2ᵃ I. 13. ut *formam habeat sanorum verborum* atque utrumque requirit *formam nempe sanorum verborum et custodiam boni depositi*: Formam, inquit, habe sanorum verborum, quae a me audisti, in fide et in dilectione Iesu Christi: bonum depositum custodi per Spiritum S. qui habitat in nobis. Cf. 1ᵃ Tim. VI. 20. |  | Hence the Apostle instructs Timothy in his 2nd epistle, I. 13, to *have a form of sound words* and requires both *namely, a form of sound words and the safeguarding of the good deposit*: “Hold,” he says, “the form of sound words which you have heard from me, in faith and in the love which is in Christ Jesus. Guard the good deposit through the Holy Spirit who dwells in us.” Cf. 1st Timothy VI. 20. |
| Hinc tot professiones fidei propositae ab Ecclesia cum obligatione illud credendi, quod iis continetur h. e. per eas secundum usum communem loquendi significatur: hinc sanctio certorum terminorum, quibus Fidei dogma certissime repraesentaretur, ut ὁμοούσιος, θεοτόκος, *transubstantiatio*, ut haeretici habiti sint, qui eorundem verum sensum negarent eosdemque improbarent. |  | Hence the many professions of faith proposed by the Church with the obligation of believing what is contained in them, that is, what is signified by them according to the common usage of speaking: hence the sanctioning of certain terms by which the dogma of Faith would be most certainly represented, such as ὁμοούσιος (homoousios), θεοτόκος (theotokos), *transubstantiation*, so that those who would deny and disapprove of their true meaning have been considered heretics. |
|  |  | What we have said concerning the infallibility of the Church’s magisterium in verbal formulas of the profession of Faith must likewise be said about other signs, such as paintings and images, by which the Church represents the doctrine of faith through her ordinary and universal magisterium; for the reasoning is the same. |
| Quod de infallibilitate magisterii Ecclesiae in formulis verbalibus professionis Fidei diximus, id et de aliis signis, puta picturis et imaginibus, dicendum est, quibus Ecclesia ordinario et universali magisterio doctrinam fidei repraesentat; est enim eadem ratio. |  | [^1]: {org. 1} Cf. Garnier’s 4th Dissertation on Marius Mercator p. 7, *on Subscriptions etc.*: where he well demonstrates that the Church had this in view when it condemned not only errors but also persons, and required subscription to both condemnations, as in the case of the Pelagian heresy. |